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Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept
of Rights
Robert L. Rabin-
In order to understand the role of rights in the development of the Ad-
ministrative State, it is essential to look at a century of administrative
history-rather than limiting one's view to the fifty years since the birth
of the New Deal. Taking the past century as my time-frame, I want to
survey briefly three epochs: the Populist-Progressive era,1 the New Deal,
and the Public Interest era.2 After identifying the major concerns ex-
pressed in the political debate over regulatory reform in each period, I
will try to forge a link between regulatory politics and the central preoc-
cupations of the judiciary. In doing so, I hope to shed some light on the
importance that courts-particularly, the Supreme Court-attached to the
conception of rights as the Administrative State evolved.
In my view, two principal themes are evident in judicial treatment of
regulatory issues during the past century: Courts have been preoccupied
with assessing legitimacy and controlling discretion.3 Each of these themes
has, as one of its concerns, a connection with conventional notions of
rights. Just as the themes are distinct, however, so are the correlative
rights conceptions. The legitimacy theme-that is, judicial efforts to define
the appropriate ambit of agency power-was elaborated against the back-
drop of a substantive conception of "rights" expressed in a private order-
" Professor of Law, Stanford University. I would like to express my appreciation to the Russell
Sage Foundation for its support of my work on the historical development of the federal administra-
tive system. This essay is based on that project.
1. For present purposes, I am considering the Populist and Progressive eras together, because my
focus is exclusively on the politics of regulatory reform at the national level, and my intention is only
to develop the historical context necessary to an understanding of the role of the federal government in
limiting private rights. I recognize that the Populist and Progressive movements had very different
origins, bases of support, and political agendas-and that each movement was itself governed by a
variety of goals in the state and local political arenas that differed markedly from the programs pur-
sued at the national level.
There is a voluminous literature on the movements. Much of the recent scholarship was stimulated
by the reappraisal of the eras, in R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955). See sources cited
infra note 5 (discussing bibliography).
2. I attach this label to the period of regulatory reform activity, characterized by the consumer and
environmental movements, that began in the late 1960's. While so-called public interest regulatory
initiatives and litigation were central features of the era, I adopt the label principally for conven-
ience-and because no generally accepted name has been bestowed on the period.
3. To state the distinction succinctly: By "assessing legitimacy" I mean an inquiry directed at
determining the appropriate sphere of administrative activity, and by "controlling discretion" I have




ing model of economic relations.4 By contrast, the judicial focus on issues
of discretion-specifically, judicial techniques for monitoring the agency
decisionmaking process-has, at times, been associated with a procedural
version of "rights" analysis; namely, the imposition of a trial-type deci-
sionmaking model to assure rational agency behavior.
My contention is that the past century has witnessed an evolutionary
process in which controlling discretion has become the principal concern
of the courts, as legitimacy issues were put to rest. Concomitantly, to the
extent that rights analysis retains any importance, it is the procedural ver-
sion of the concept that has continuing vitality. But the picture is some-
what more complex than this summary assertion might suggest. For my
basic contention is that the conception of rights, even in its procedural
guise, is on the periphery of the current preoccupation with control of
discretion-as I hope to demonstrate in the following brief excursion
through a century of political and judicial developments.
I. The Populist-Progressive Era
As far as federal regulatory legislation is concerned, the era preceding
the New Deal was characterized by the fundamental premise that govern-
mental intervention in the private ordering system ought to be limited to
occasional policing activity.5 A smoothly functioning market was viewed
as the best means for maximizing social welfare. Such agencies as the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Bureau of Chemistry (fore-
runner of the Food and Drug Administration) and the Meat Inspectorate
in the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), were established under the guiding assumption that the private
market model would work, if only its excesses could be eliminated. Each
of these agencies was assigned the role of policing and regulating "wrong-
ful" or "unreasonable" conduct in order to re-establish a sense of equilib-
rium in the network of privately negotiated commercial dealings.
The first of the federal regulatory commissions, the ICC, was estab-
lished in 1887 after a decade of debate over the appropriate scope of rail-
road regulation. Each of the contending interests-railroads, shippers,
4. This economic perspective on legitimacy is distinct from the political conception traditionally
associated with the non-delegation doctrine, which rests principally on separation of powers concerns.
See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 15-94 (1978).
5. Again, I want to emphasize that my remarks are directed to reform efforts at the national level.
The goals of the Populist movement at the state level appear to have rested on quite different assump-
tions about the proper scope of governmental activity. See L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT
(1978).
Moreover, it seems clear that Progressive reform initiatives at the state and local level exhibited a
wide variety of often contradictory ideological premises. For a discussion of the conflicting ideological
themes and historical interpretations of Progressive thought, see Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism,
REVS. AM. HIST., Dec. 1982, at 113.
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merchants, and farmers-sought to "rationalize" competition in accor-
dance with its own economic needs. The result was a weak, and in some
instances ambiguous, statute prohibiting discriminatory trade practices.'
Similarly, the Bureau of Chemistry officials and meat inspectors were leg-
islatively mandated to police unconscionable business activities-human
health risks that arose from lack of consumer information (which, in the
current idiom, would be identified as one variety of "market failure").
And, of course, the FTC was given responsibility for attacking what was
regarded by many Progressives as the prototypical instance of market dys-
function: the growth of monopoly power.7 While the responsibilities of
these agencies were by no means parallel-ranging across investigating,
inspecting, and prosecuting roles-they shared a central focus on prohibi-
tion of "excesses" in the marketplace.
In the beginning, then, regulatory legislation was seen as a corrective.
Business leaders eager to engage in cartel-like activities favored a passive
regulatory presence-an environment in which they could enter into pri-
vate cooperative agreements with impunity-rather than an active govern-
mental role. And for those who feared industrial dominance, agencies
were a means of policing overzealous commercial interests that sought un-
fair advantage under the existing rules.
Subscribing to this restrictive view of the appropriate conditions for
governmental intervention, the courts were preoccupied with assuring the
legitimacy of agency assertions of power. It was not just that regulatory
agencies were a brand-new phenomenon-which they were, of
course-but also that the very notion of buttressing the market economy
from the outside, so to speak, was entirely novel.8 Thus, many of the lead-
ing Supreme Court decisions, providing the interpretative foundations for
the new regulatory legislation, were devoted to a vigorous policing of the
substantive boundaries of the agencies.9
Indeed, read apart from the political history of the time, many of these
6. There is a vast literature on the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). An
excellent recent source is S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: TIlE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 123-50 (1982). Between 1903 and 1920, Con-
gress passed a succession of amendments, expanding the powers of the ICC to the point at which the
agency eventually was given rather substantial planning authority. See id. at 249-84.
7. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was also given more general authority to police unfair
trade practices. The best early study of the FTC is G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION (1924).
8. The agencies established prior to 1887 were principally intended to provide public services,
distribute government largess, and collect taxes. For a concise historical treatment, see Wilson, The
Rise of the Bureaucratic State, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16 (R. Rabin ed.
1979).
9. Notwithstanding the voluminous literature on the non-delegation doctrine, the principal con-
gressional technique for restricting agency power has been the Court's repeated tendency to construe
narrowly agency enabling legislation.
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cases seem remarkably uncharitable. Consider, for example, FTC v.
Gratz,10 in which the Court read section 5 of the FTC Act," prohibiting
"unfair methods of competition in commerce," as limiting the FTC to
prosecution of those anti-competitive acts condemned at common law.2
Or, United States v. Johnson,"3 in which defendant had knowingly labeled
his patent medicine as a cancer cure, and the Court nonetheless read the
prohibition on misbranding in the Food and Drug Act to cover only false
statements regarding ingredients and not effects-despite a statutory pro-
hibition on misbranding "which [is] false or misleading in any particu-
lar."" Or, to provide a final example, the leading case of ICC v. Alabama
Midland Railway,'5 in which the Court overturned the ICC's effort to
give substance to a weak legislative prohibition of rate discrimination be-
tween long-haul and short-haul trips-a regulatory effort aimed at a
principal source of the hostility created by the railroad's competitive
practices.' 6
The linkage between this overriding concern with the legitimacy of
agency power-the chipping away at the edges of the agency's substantive
mandate-and the conception of rights is fairly straightforward. The con-
cern about individual commercial autonomy and an unimpeded flow of
market transactions, which is at the core of the conventional substantive
notion of rights, was a key factor in leading the Court to limit the field of
each agency's authority so severely.' 7 Thus, the "rights" model loomed
large in judicial thinking during the Populist-Progressive period of regula-
tory politics.
10. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
11. Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1982)).
12. See also FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 289 (1924) (narrowly construing agency's
investigatory powers); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (holding that agency had to estab-
lish harm to competitors, not merely consumers, to make out statutory violation). Congress reacted to
Raladam by passing the Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58 (1982)), overturning the decision.
13. 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
14. Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770 (1906) (repealed 1938). Congress reacted to
Johnson by passing the Sherley Amendment, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912) (repealed
1938), overturning the holding.
15. 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
16. Alabama Midland is one of a series of narrow constructions of the Interstate Commerce Act
that eventually led to the congressional amendments of the statute. The cases are discussed in S.
SKOWRONEK, supra note 6, at 150-60.
17. It was not, however, the only factor. Beginning in Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota,
134 U.S. 418 (1890), the Court asserted its authority to conduct de novo review of agency-established
transportation rates. The exercise of de novo review in this and later cases undoubtedly reflected
judicial suspicion of agency decisionmaking processes distinct from an abstract concern about safe-
guarding property interests.
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II. The New Deal
The dominant political impulse in the New Deal was sharply at odds
with that of the preceding era."8 Shaken by the Depression, the political
leadership of the country no longer accepted the premises of the private
ordering model as providing a sufficient foundation for a socioeconomic
system. Instead, the Roosevelt Administration began to experiment with a
mixed bag of regulatory reforms aimed both at achieving economic recov-
ery and bolstering economic security. 9 Agency programs were established
that could be taken to reflect a number of, almost certainly, irreconcilable
convictions: that governmental planning, in cooperation with large-scale
business, labor, and consumer groups, was the best means of achieving the
public interest in economic recovery and security; that governmental coor-
dination of an essentially privately-run system of business cartels was
most likely to effect a return to economic well-being; and that governmen-
tal intervention to re-establish a competitive society dominated by small
businesses would counter the ill effects of fifty years of growing industrial
concentration.
While these ideologies were by no means consistent, they did yield a
virtual consensus on one point: that a free market economy, subject only to
relatively minor policing activities, was an anachronism and a menace to
long-term social welfare. Out of this conviction grew new regulatory pro-
grams in vital economic areas such as banking, agriculture, social security,
and labor relations. 0
As new relationships were created between government, the private
business sector, and the individual, a wide array of agencies were given,
for the first time, genuinely managerial-type responsibilities. Indeed, in
his most ambitious move, Roosevelt proposed, and Congress enacted, the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),21 providing for Codes of Fair
Competition-governing prices, wages, hours, advertising practices, and
such-which were to be promulgated by industrial trade groups and im-
plemented by a newly-established federal agency.2" Perhaps more than
18. But see Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an "Associa-
tive State," 1921-1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 116 (1974-75) (discussing governmental encouragement of
the trade association movement in 1920's).
19. The diverse programs and their often contradictory ideological underpinnings are well dis-
cussed in E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966). Like the earlier
movements, the New Deal is notable for the absence of a coherent, unified reform strategy. See supra
notes 1, 5.
20. For general discussions of the New Deal programs, see, e.g., W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963), and P. CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL (2d ed. 1975). The
standard early account dividing the New Deal into two phases, an early period concerned with eco-
nomic recovery and a later period emphasizing economic security, is B. RAUCH, THE HISTORY OF THE
NEW DEAL: 1933-1938 (1944).
21. Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
22. See E. HAWLEY, supra note 19, at 19-146.
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any other single New Deal program, the NIRA heralded a new, expan-
sive conception of activist government.
Government agencies now assumed the functions of Manager-Benefac-
tor, rather than merely serving as Investigator-Enforcer. As might be ex-
pected, such a dramatic shift in regulatory ideology, fitfully unveiled in
the New Deal programs, once again brought issues of the legitimacy of
agency power to the forefront.23 The private ordering model of the econ-
omy, as a constraint on the regulatory authority that might legitimately be
vested in an agency, had one last stand in the courts. And indeed, in the
landmark Schechter case,24 the substantive conception of rights achieved a
stunning victory, before its decisive retreat beyond the borders of the new
Administrative State.
The Schechter case, testing the constitutionality of the NIRA, in fact,
stands at the crossroads-marking off the intersection of the two major
themes in judicial discourse that form the focus of this essay: assessing
legitimacy and controlling discretion. In striking down the Act, the Court
invoked the non-delegation doctrine on three grounds: the unbounded sub-
stantive mandate (allowing virtually every aspect of business conduct to be
regulated in the Codes of Fair Competition), the improper delegation to
private parties (giving industry groups the main role in establishing the
Codes), and the failure to provide adequate procedural safeguards for for-
mulating policy. Clearly, the first two grounds rely heavily on a model of
economic relations-a substantive rights model-that places high value on
freedom from governmental interference and limited restrictions on private
property. At the same time, the Court's third concern rests on its percep-
tion of the need to monitor effectively the rationality of administrative pol-
icy; in other words, control of agency discretion is the guiding force behind
the demand for adequate procedural safeguards.
Interestingly, Schechter is the concluding chapter in the half century of
concern about legitimacy. Just as the Court was subsequently to abandon
its harsh treatment of the agencies of the Populist-Progressive era, so too
did the post-Schechter judiciary come to terms with the New Deal concep-
tion of governmental activism. The Court's propensity to question the le-
gitimacy of agency authority was put to rest-and correlatively, the sub-
stantive conception of "rights" linked, as it was, to the private ordering
model fell into desuetude. Instead, the major concern of the post-Schechter
23. On the eve of the New Deal, the Investigator-Enforcer role of agencies had become well
accepted. In part, the Court had been "educated" by congressional responses to its strict construction-
ism. See supra notes 12, 14, 16.
24. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), and Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court similarly expressed its hostility towards Roosevelt's New Deal
regulatory legislatiofi.
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Court became the control of administrative discretion.
But the new status accorded to issues of agency discretion did not, in
turn, create an activist judiciary. A more subtle interplay occurred. For
the New Deal also heralded the rise of faith in expertise.15 And as a
consequence, while control of discretion as an issue became the Court's
major preoccupation, the judicial mood was distinctly deferential. In the
great cases of the post-New Deal era-Morgan,26 Hearst,
27 Chenery,,28
and Universal Camera,29 to cite a few representative examples-the Court
was constantly involved in defining its own role in implementing a regula-
tory scheme, but invariably ended up extolling the virtues of bureaucratic
specialization and professionalism.
Thus, as the era progresses, the "rights" tradition recedes into the past.
The substantive rights model relinquishes its dominant influence with the
dissolution of the Schechter Court. And the procedural version of the
rights concept-the trial-type hearing as a model for controlling discre-
tion-lays dormant in an era of deference to administrative expertise.30
III. The Public Interest Era
By 1970, it was possible to identify a new wave of regulatory reform
that was distinct in character from that of the New Deal. The Depression,
of course, had been the precipitating event that triggered the New Deal.
By contrast, the reform impulse that began to build in the late 1960's
came at a time of economic prosperity. Nonetheless, it was a deeply troub-
led period. Vietnam cast a pall over everyday life. Race relations seethed
with unresolved tensions. And domestically, a host of concerns arose that
had little to do with economic well-being. Long-term health and safety,
25. For a classic exposition, see J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). In fact,
Progressives had shown a similar faith in expertise. See, e.g., P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
16-37 (1969) (discussing administration of workman's compensation legislation); S. HAYS, CONSERVA-
TION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY. THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920
(1959) (analyzing origins of conservation movement). But this faith had not been widely adopted by
the courts.
26. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Morgan IV).
27. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
28. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II).
29. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
30. I would note two important qualifications, however. First, the procedural version of the rights
concept was, in fact, influential in the legislative forum; witness the provisions for agency adjudication
in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1982), enacted in 1946, as well as in
various agency enabling acts. Second, there are constitutional "right to hearing" cases decided during
the period that recognize procedural-as well as substantive-"rights," modelled on traditional pro-
tections of property interests. For a discussion, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). But the constitutional "right to
hearing" cases do not, for the most part, involve regulatory programs of the kind we are considering.
Rather, these cases arise in areas such as occupational licensing and government job security, which
bear stronger resemblance to private contract and property relations than to bureaucratic
policymaking.
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preservation of natural sites and species, and a variety of similar problems
attained considerable public visibility, and were translated into political
demands that came to be labelled "quality of life" concerns. This cluster
of issues sparked a vigorous debate over the propriety of pluralistic politics
and the meaning of "the public interest," and in turn initiated a new
wave of governmental activism. 1
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), passed in 1969, is a
classic illustration of the new reforms. It includes a general proclamation
that concern for the quality of the environment is a top priority of the
federal government, and operationally, that every federal agency is to take
account of environmental impacts in making decisions that might affect
the human environment.3 2 A similar thrust-toward quality of life con-
cerns-is found in the other major regulatory legislation of the period,
such as the Clean Air Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Occupa-
tion Safety and Health Act, Consumer Product Safety Act, National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as well as in the establishment of new
regulatory agencies to administer these congressional initiatives."3
Despite the sharp departure in substantive concerns, the new reform
legislation did not rekindle old fears about the legitimacy of agency power.
No one seriously questioned the authority of Congress to provide the En-
vironmental Protection Agency with a broad mandate to set air pollution
control standards, or the propriety of legislation that gave the Occupation
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) power to establish a network
of occupational health and safety standards. On the contrary, the tacit
assumption was that quality of life reforms were exclusively a question of
efficacious policy, rather than a cause for re-examining the role of regula-
tory agencies in the constitutional framework. This easy acquiescence on
the issue of agency power reinforced the course of late New Deal thought:
in the Administrative State, there are no practical limitations on the po-
tential scope of agency authority. 4
At the same time, however, the courts developed a strikingly new atti-
31. For a thoughtful critique of pluralist politics, see T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed.
1979).
32. For discussion of the act, see R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976). The requirement of an environmental impact statement is found
in § 102(2)(C) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
33. Consider, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency, established in 1970 to imple-
ment and enforce much of the existing environmental protection legislation. NEPA itself provided for
the Council on Environmental Quality, an Executive agency charged with coordinating and advisory
functions.
34. I would emphasize, however, that the diminished concern about legitimacy does not denote the
wholesale extinction of a substantive conception of rights-that is, that all individually-held entitle-
ments are contingent. See supra note 30. Rather, I am suggesting that the private ordering model-so
central to pre-New Deal thinking-did not operate as a constraint on the kinds of functions that
agencies might undertake.
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tude towards control over agency discretion. Abandoning the deferential
mood of the 1940's and 1950's, the judiciary became preoccupied with
"the hard look."35 In an often-cited statement of the contemporary posi-
tion, Judge Bazelon noted:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing
courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative policy de-
cisions with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily to
matters of procedure. On matters of substance, the courts regularly
upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction of the "substantial
evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative exper-
tise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power
to set aside agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor
had entered into the decision, or a crucial factor had not been consid-
ered. Gradually, however, that power has come into more frequent
use, and with it, the requirement that administrators articulate the
factors on which they base their decisions. 8
Why did this distinctive shift in attitude occur? At least two reasons
seem central to an understanding of the new tendency to subject regula-
tory decisions to careful scrutiny. First, the new wave of regulatory reform
created agencies whose subject matter was often characterized by indeter-
minacy of harm (or, correspondingly, the new quality of life concerns
often expanded the list of considerations that established agencies were
required to take into account). This problem of indeterminacy was some-
times raised by scientific uncertainty-as in the hybrid rulemaking cases
dealing with issues of pollution control or nuclear safety.87 In another
class of cases, the indeterminacy problem arose because of difficulties in
quantifying intangible values-illustrated by classic licensing controversies
like Scenic Hudson.8 Whether scientific uncertainty or intangible values
were involved, the courts were now uneasy about the old claims for defer-
ence to expertise; the received wisdom about expertise seemed open to
question.
Second, the course of recent history had taken its toll. Vietnam, minor-
35. The term is Judge Harold Leventhal's. See Greater Boston Television Corp v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), where he applied it to agency
decisionmaking responsibilities. But the "hard look" concept has been taken to be equally applicable
to courts in exercising judicial review of agency decisions.
36. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. See Yellin, High Technology and the Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 489, 494-500 (1981).
38. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (Scenic Hudson I)
(construction of hydroelectric power plant at point of scenic and historical value on the Hudson
River); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) (Scenic Hudson II),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
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ity unrest, Naderism, and congeries of other factors had contributed to a
dramatic loss of faith in experts-indeed, in the world of "officials"-that
had become pervasive by 1970. Skepticism about the rational implementa-
tion of governmental policy was rampant. The judiciary was not insulated
from these corrosive tendencies.
Thus, a real preoccupation with controlling discretion arose, and con-
comitantly, judicial review decisions began to manifest a tendency to
search for The Ultimate Rational Process. In fact, throughout the 1970's
the federal judiciary oscillated between two discrete tendencies, which
might be characterized as a Demand for Truth, evinced through remands
requiring more and better data in a search for The Right Answer; and an
Assurance of Good Faith, satisfied by sufficient data to demonstrate a Best
Effort Under the Circumstances. 9
This oscillation is evident in the leading administrative law cases de-
cided in the Public Interest era. For present purposes, a brief catalogue,
with somewhat greater attention to one entry, will have to suffice.
(1) In the area of informal adjudication, compare Overton Park,4 re-
quiring what amounts to virtually de novo review in the trial court,41 with
Camp v. Pitts,"2 limiting review to the contemporaneous administrative
record.
(2) In the informal rulemaking area, compare the D.C. Circuit's hybrid
rulemaking cases, 43 requiring procedural safeguards beyond the notice-
and-comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),44
with Vermont Yankee,45 interpreting the APA in a more literal fashion.
46
39. These tendencies are not polar extremes. Indeed, both positions expressed an activist mood
regarding the role of the judiciary. A broader continuum might be defined in which a Demand for
Truth and an Assurance of Good Faith are intermediate points on a scale featuring a De Novo
Review position at one end and a Deference to Expertise position at the other.
Because of space limitations, I am ignoring the important distinction between controlling discretion
through requirements imposed on internal agency processes and controlling discretion through modu-
lation of judicial scrutiny. The two techniques may or may not be employed in tandem.
40. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1971).
41. 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (on remand). The trial consumed 25 days and involved
the submission of 240 exhibits and 287 pages of written briefs. Id. at 878.
42. 411 U.S. 138, 141-43 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Interna-
tional Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630, 647-50 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland Cement
Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 390-402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
45. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 539-48 (1978).
46. For a good sampling of views in the debate over informal rulemaking procedures, see Breyer,
Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1833
(1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee rnd the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different
View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978).
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(3) In construing the requirements of NEPA, compare Calvert Cliffs"7
and its progeny, 48 suggesting the need for "substantive review" of environ-
mental impact statements, with Stryckers' Bay,49 reading NEPA as an
exclusively procedural mandate.
(4) In the OSHA cost-benefit analysis cases,50 compare the intra-court
differences on what constitutes an adequate administrative record in sup-
port of agency-established standards.
Let me develop my position in somewhat greater detail by expanding
on one item on this brief list-the cost-benefit cases involving OSHA's
promulgation of occupational health standards for benzene and cotton
dust. As an initial matter, both raise statutory interpretation issues,
namely, whether Congress intended OSHA to set standards requiring the
maximum feasible economic and technological investment in promoting
health, or standards demanding only a "reasonable" (cost-benefit justified)
investment. In Benzene, the plurality avoided the statutory issue by focus-
ing on OSHA's failure to make a threshold finding that the substance
created a "substantial risk" of causing cancer at low exposure levels.51 In
Cotton Dust, a majority of the Justices found the risk substantial and
proceeded to read the statute as requiring a maximum feasible investment
in health protection.5" Most important from our standpoint, however, in
both cases once the statutory construction issue was put aside, the Court
focused on the rationality of the agency's decisionmaking process.
The Benzene case is a classic example of agency decisionmaking under
conditions of scientific uncertainty. OSHA had data clearly indicating that
47. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
48. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir.
1972); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d
1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 951-53 (7th Cir. 1973); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1138-40 (5th Cir. 1974); Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1013-14 (E.D. Tenn.), affl'd per curiam, 492
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
49. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
50. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (OSHA cotton dust standard);
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) (OSHA
benzene standard).
51. 448 U.S. at 639-40.
52. 452 U.S. at 494, 509. The Cotton Dust Court's analysis of the scope of power issue is a
prototypical instance of the judicial approach in the Public Interest era. There is no question raised
about the agency's substantive authority, as such-that is, no one doubts that the agency has the right
to establish workplace safety standards for cotton dust emissions. Moreover, no one questions the
legislative authority to mandate the agency to "take" the regulated party's property by assigning costs
in excess of the efficient investment in safety-that is, mandating reduction of health hazards to the
"maximum extent feasible." Rather, the scope of power issue is whether Congress intended the
agency to pursue one legitimate social welfare goal-balancing health concerns against economic
costs-or another-promoting health considerations as much as possible. The crucial point is that the
analysis of the agency's substantive power is wholly process-oriented; it goes entirely to the question of
how the agency ought to weigh competing social values, rather than to the issue of whether the agency
can legitimately intrude upon established rights and interests.
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at high exposure levels benzene was a carcinogen. In addition, OSHA had
studies indicating that at somewhat lower levels, benzene caused other
health hazards. But the agency had no information of harmful effects be-
low a certain emissions level.53 The risks did not necessarily disappear. It
was simply the case that no existing studies indicated what harm, if any,
would occur at relatively low exposure rates.
Under such circumstances, what was the agency's responsibility? The
plurality, searching for The Right Answer-through a rather dubious ex-
ercise in statutory interpretation-held that OSHA had the burden of
meeting a threshold requirement of establishing a "significant risk" before
it set any standard at all. Thus, the agency was put to the choice of either
producing studies that substantially reduced the scientific uncertainty at
lower levels of risk or refraining from setting standards in that zone of
potential harm. By contrast, the dissenters, subscribing to a Best Efforts
approach, would have required only that the agency provide the best sup-
porting data it could under the circumstances." Having satisfied them-
selves that the more lenient standard had been met, the dissenters were, in
fact, willing to approve the OSHA standard despite the agency's inability
to establish a dose-response curve at low emissions levels.55
The Cotton Dust case illustrates a similar tension-this time in estab-
lishing cost projections of a health standard. Here, the pervasive influence
of "uncertainty" is more subtle, but nonetheless at the crux of the con-
trasting judicial attitudes towards the agency's justificatory responsibili-
ties. The majority opinion, approving OSHA's reliance on an economic
feasibility (rather than a cost-benefit) approach, finds adequate support in
the administrative record for the established cotton dust standard. Justice
Stewart dissents on just this point. The thrust of his disagreement is high-
ly instructive. He argues:
The simple truth about OSHA's assessment of the cost of the Cot-
ton Dust Standard is that the agency never relied on any study or
report purporting to predict the cost to industry of the Standard
finally adopted by the agency. OSHA did have before it one cost
analysis, that of the Research Triangle Institute, which attempted to
predict the cost of the final Standard. However, as recognized by the
Court,. . . the agency flatly rejected that prediction as a gross over-
estimate. The only other estimate OSHA had, the Hocutt-Thomas
estimate prepared by industry researchers, was not designed to pre-
dict the cost of the final OSHA Standard. Rather, it assumed a far
less stringent and inevitably far less costly standard for all phases of
53. See 448 U.S. at 634-38
54. Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 700.
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cotton production except roving. . . . The agency examined the
Hocutt-Thomas study, and concluded that it too was an overestimate
of the costs of the less stringent standard it was addressing. I am
willing to defer to OSHA's determination that the Hocutt-Thomas
study was such an overestimate, conceding that such subtle financial
and technical matters lie within the discretion and skill of the
agency. But in a remarkable non sequitur, the agency decided that
because the Hocutt-Thomas study was an overestimate of the cost of
a less stringent standard, it could be treated as a reliable estimate for
the more costly final Standard actually promulgated, never rationally
explaining how it came to this happy conclusion. This is not sub-
stantial evidence. It is unsupported speculation.56
Why did the majority tolerate OSHA's ultimate reliance on the discred-
ited Hocutt-Thomas study? Justice Brennan's opinion is revealing:
The agency itself recognized the problem [with the Hocutt-Thomas
study] but found itself limited in the precision of its estimates by the
industry's refusal to make more of its own data available. OSHA
explained that, "in the absence of the [industry] survey data [of tex-
tile mills], OSHA cannot develop more accurate estimates of compli-
ance costs." . . . Since § 6(b)(5) of the Act requires that the Secre-
tary promulgate toxic material and harmful physical agent standards
"on the basis of the best available evidence," 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5),
and since OSHA could not obtain the more detailed confidential in-
dustry data it thought essential to further precision, we conclude that
the agency acted reasonably in adopting the Hocutt-Thomas esti-
mate. While a cost estimated based on the standard actually promul-
gated surely would be preferable, we decline to hold as a matter of
law that its absence under the circumstances required the Court of
Appeals to find that OSHA's determination was unsupported by
substantial evidence.
57
In essence, Justice Brennan is arguing that the agency did the best it
could under the circumstances, and that is all the Court will require. The
study OSHA commissioned was botched; the industry-sponsored study
was based on limited data and wrong assumptions-all of which was be-
yond OSHA's control, but in fact about par for the course.
Again scientific uncertainty played a role-albeit indirectly. Because
OSHA could not establish a dose-response curve, it had no threshold level
of health risk to guide its compliance cost analysis; as a consequence, the
Hocutt-Thomas researchers operated on imprecise information about the
range of reduction in health risk that the agency was considering. Only
56. 452 U.S. at 542-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 527-29 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted).
1186
Vol. 92: 1174, 1983
Comment on Mashaw
after OSHA had compliance cost information in hand, did it feel greater
confidence about setting an actual target for reduction of risk. And, at that
point, a reduction in risk more substantial than that considered by the
researchers appeared feasible.
Thus, cost projections, like risk determinations, ultimately turn out to
be quite speculative. Agency decisionmaking processes that are premised
on an initial evaluation strategy that appears to be highly rational, even-
tually rely on "best available evidence" and assumptions about a range of
more-or-less reasonable scenarios. OSHA could have been instructed to
spend two more years and still greater resources on more consulting stud-
ies. In the meantime, new epidemiological data and capital investments
would cast doubt on the next round of studies. Methodological flaws in
the revised analysis would be revealed, and once again the issue would be
whether a Demand for Truth or an Assurance of Good Faith should be
the ultimate standard. And the Court would most likely divide sharply, as
it did in Benzene and Cotton Dust.
I am arguing, then, that the most salient feature of judicial review in
the Public Interest era has been the debate over just how intensively the
courts ought to monitor agency decisions characterized by various kinds of
uncertainty. Returning to our earlier inquiry, how does my analysis relate
to the concept of "rights"? Do conventional notions of rights continue to
exercise a central influence on judicial thinking in the administrative law
of the Public Interest period? In my view, the answer is no. The
landmark cases to which I have referred are primarily concerned with
bureaucratic processes for reconciling broad collective interests of social
groups and industry.
To the extent that rights retain some vestigial importance in Public In-
terest cases, it is the procedural model that warrants attention. More spe-
cifically, when courts oscillate towards a Demand for Truth they some-
times impose on agencies elements of the decisionmaking model that the
judiciary has traditionally viewed as best-suited for assuring accuracy in
the resolution of conflicting claims: the trial-type hearing.5 8 In the context
of a continuing New Deal program, the landmark case of Goldberg v.
Kelly59-involving eligibility determinations in the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program-is a contemporary instance of this point:
an effort to utilize what the Court perceived as the best technique for
58. For a good discussion of the elements of the model, see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,"
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975). Even if the court imposes less than a full-scale trial-type hearing,
the model may provide the measuring-stick against which agency processes are evaluated. See Judge
Bazelon's opinions in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), and NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 547 F.2d
633, 643-45 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
59. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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guarding against administrative error and assuring accuracy. But the im-
pulse to judicialize the administrative process through wholesale infusion
of rights analysis has been a weak one on the whole.60 And the substan-
tive rights aspect of Goldberg-the New Property notion 6l-has had no
discernible analogical force in the implementation of Public Interest
programs. 62
IV. A Concluding Note
The paradigm Public Interest cases, dealing with pollution, ecological,
health and safety risks, raise concerns about bureaucratic rationality
rather than about particularized rights.6" As a result, the concept of rights
has become of secondary significance-almost lost in a rising tide of con-
cern about a wide variety of techniques for controlling discretion in pro-
grams affecting broad-based societal interests. In this milieu, not only the
tradition-minded judges of the Populist-Progressive era, but the deferen-
tial judiciary of the New Deal as well, seem the product of a strikingly
different age.
60. Even in government benefit cases, Goldberg has been limited. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976). And the Goldberg approach has had very little influence on Public Interest cases.
But cf supra note 58 (discussing Judge Bazelon's views).
61. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
62. Nonetheless, the New Property conception of substantive rights does retain vitality in govern-
ment largess cases-albeit not without continuing controversy. I am suggesting, of course, that these
perennial cases are not really central to the regulatory concerns that have triggered the most conse-
quential political developments and judicial responses since the mid-1960's.
63. For the classic sociological perspective on the problems of bureaucratic rationality that courts
have confronted in steadily increasing volume since the New Deal, see M. WEBER, Bureaucracy, in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (1946).
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